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CALMING THE FIRE: HOW A NEGLIGENCE 
STANDARD AND BROAD COST-RECOVERY 
CAN HELP RESTORE NATIONAL FORESTS 
AFTER WILDFIRES 
Charles Riordan* 
Abstract: This Note provides an overview of the statutory and common 
law relating to forest fires, with a particular focus on fires started by power 
lines in National Forests. Fire is a constant threat to America’s forests and 
is capable of doing enormous damage to critical ecological systems. Yet 
the legal ramifications of forest fires are often determined by state law, 
which leads to doctrinal inconsistency. Recently, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has joined California courts in allowing the 
federal government to bring broad damages claims against utility compa-
nies responsible for forest fires. Other states, by contrast, limit the types of 
damages that the government can claim. The standard of liability for for-
est fires can be similarly ambiguous. The best way forward, from an envi-
ronmental perspective, is to condition recovery on a showing of negli-
gence, while granting restoration costs in cases where culpability is clear. 
Introduction 
 In September 2011, a forest fire in Bastrop County, Texas de-
stroyed more than 1600 homes and burned more than 34,000 acres of 
land.1 By some measures, it was the largest fire ever to strike Texas.2 
Gusting winds and an ongoing drought exacerbated the fire, but the 
initial cause was mundane: a dead tree falling against a power line.3 
 The Bastrop Fire was not the first of its kind. Power lines are not 
the most common source of forest fires, but fires started by power lines 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2013–2014. 
1 Ciara O’Rourke & Patrick George, What Caused the Bastrop Fire?, Austin Am.-
Statesman, Sept. 21, 2011, at A01. 
2 See Jordan Breal et al., Trial by Fire, Tex. Monthly, Dec. 2011, at 134, 134 (“In terms 
of human habitation, it was the single most devastating wildfire in Texas history.”). 
3 See Ricardo Gándara, Bastrop Victims Sue Utility, Claim Negligence, Austin Am.-
Statesman, Sept. 27, 2011, at A08. 
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often occur in remote locations, and can be devastating.4 California 
estimates that power lines cause one to three percent of its fires each 
year, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has reported that 
the actual number could easily be larger.5 Any power line running 
through a forest is a fire hazard because encroaching vegetation often 
causes fires.6 
 In the face of this threat, federal and state governments are ag-
gressively pursuing public utilities for costs related to forest fires.7 Utili-
ty companies in California have paid tens of millions of dollars in set-
tlements;8 one company has even applied (unsuccessfully) for a rate 
increase to cover uninsured costs.9 Utilities have complained that they 
might be found liable for forest fires even when complying with safety 
regulations.10 Moreover, a recent ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit seems to expand the range of potential damages 
to include a forest fire’s “intangible” effects.11 This presents a quandary 
for utility companies that are obligated to serve fire-prone areas.12 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Utility Vegetation Management 
Final Report 7 (2004) [hereinafter UVM Report]. 
5 See id. at 7 n.7. California averaged slightly more than five thousand fires annually 
from 2008­2012. Incident Information, Cal Fire (Jan. 21, 2011), http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/ 
incidents/incidents_stats?year=2012 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/ 
0VkTY8NoBsH. 
6 See e.g., UVM Report, supra note 4, at 7. The Bastrop County Complex fire of 2011 
was one of several Central Texas fires thought to be caused by downed power lines. See 
O’Rourke & George, supra note 1, at A01. 
7 See Steven S. Kimball, Forest Fire Damages in Transition, 56 Fed. Law. 38, 38–39 (2009) 
(“The growth in the size and frequency of forest fires may have been outpaced recently by 
the dramatic increase in damages claimed by the United States from defendants whose 
negligence assertedly ignited a fire.”); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Legal Issues in Forest Fire Cost 
Recovery, Ca. Forests, Spring 2012, at 20, 20 (noting that California has devoted a state 
department to cost recovery). 
8 See Demian Bulwa, PG&E Settles Forest-Fire Suits for $29.5 Million, S.F. Chron., Mar. 15, 
2012, available at http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/PG-E-settles-forest-fire-suits-for-29-5-
million-3407791.php and http://perma.cc/0cfwrVuHncM; John Ellis, Power Firm Settles 
Calif. Forest Fire Lawsuit for $14m, Fresno Bee, Sept. 22, 2006, available at http://www. 
firerescue1.com/fire-news/238029-power-firm-settles-calif-forest-fire-lawsuit-for-14m/ and 
http://perma.cc/0DoiiLdgWaS (noting that a 2006 forest fire settlement was one of the 
largest of its kind in American history). In 2008, a railroad company paid more than $102 
million to settle damages claims arising out of a 2000 forest fire. See United States of America 
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 39 Trials Digest 11th 20 (2008), 2008 WL 4287139 
(Railroad settles forest fire claims for $102 million). 
9 See Morgan Lee, SDG&E Fire Recovery Plan Rejected, San Diego Union Trib., Dec. 21, 
2012, available at http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/dec/21/tp-sdge-fire-recovery-
plan-rejected and http://perma.cc/0nLUTVqMSVW. 
10 See id. 
11 See United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2012). 
12 Lee, supra note 9. 
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 This Note addresses the legal issues surrounding utility lines and 
forest fires on federal land and focuses on theories of liability and re-
coverable damages. Courts have split on how to treat claims arising 
from power line fires. A line of cases in Western states, especially Cali-
fornia, apply broad theories of liability, while a smaller line of cases lim-
it potential causes-of-action based on narrow statutory interpretation.13 
California courts also treat federally owned forests differently from oth-
er types of land when calculating fire damages.14 This Note argues that 
the best way to assign forest fire costs fairly and accurately is for courts 
to condition recovery upon a showing of negligence, while allowing 
broad cost recovery claims in cases where culpability is clear.15 Broad 
cost-recovery, when applicable, can help fund the type of restoration 
efforts that are vital to rebuilding and protecting our national forests.16 
 Part I of this Note discusses statutory and common law liability for 
forest fires.17 The critical issues are whether the United States can re-
cover fire suppression costs under ambiguous state statutes, and wheth-
er the common law will impose no-fault liability for a forest fire.18 Part 
II discusses what potential damages can be recovered after a fire strikes 
National Forest land. This discussion includes damage to tangible assets 
such as timber, as well as the intangible, environmental services that 
forests provide.19 Finally, Part III offers a path forward based on the 
understanding that forest fires, though unavoidable, have enormous 
ecological and economic effects that the legal system should account 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
14 Compare United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (E.D. Cal. 
2008) (noting that cases involving damage to real property have little relevance to protect-
ed government forest lands that have no market value), and Feather River Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929) (holding that recovery for damage to prop-
erty without market value is not restricted by normal rules for calculating damages), with 
Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1980) (noting that the normal rule 
for damage to real property is the difference in the property’s value before and after the 
injury). 
15 See infra notes 198–267 and accompanying text. Due to the broad scope of the topic, 
this Note’s analysis is restricted to fires started by power lines on federal land. 
16 See Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and 
Litigation, 36 Envtl. L. 301, 382 (“Restoring fire and fire-resilient ecosystems to the public 
lands will be both an expensive and long term process requiring adequate and secure fund-
ing.”); see also Sarah Gilman, As Rim Fire Scorches Yosemite, Forest Service Cuts Restoration Funding, 
High Country News, The GOAT Blog (Aug. 27, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.hcn.org/ 
blogs/goat/as-rim-fire-scorches-yosemite-forest-service-cuts-restoration-funding, available at 
http://perma.cc/0uZf7paiTmv (noting that the Forest Service will withhold $18 million for 
habitat and restoration work in 2013 to meet sequestration requirements). 
17 See infra notes 22–92 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 22–92 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 93–196 and accompanying text. 
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for, ideally by allowing recovery of restoration costs after a forest fire.20 
A legal preference for restoration would help preserve the ecological 
benefits that forests provide, thus protecting the environment as a 
whole.21 
I. Liability for Forest Fires 
 When a forest fire starts on federal land, the government agency 
managing the land must determine the cause and assess any billable 
costs.22 Generally, the agency will attempt to recover costs only when 
the fire occurred due to negligence.23 Costs can be recovered either 
through an administrative process or through the Affirmative Civil En-
forcement program, in which a civil lawsuit is filed against an offending 
party.24 
 If a power line causes the fire, the line owner might be liable to the 
government for both suppression costs and damages to resources, in-
cluding the costs of rehabilitating and improving the land.25 Because 
utility companies are almost always insured against fires, most lawsuits 
brought by the government against utility companies are settled.26 Typ-
ical causes-of-action for power line fires can nevertheless be gleaned 
from disputed cases, pre-settlement motions, and agency guidance.27 
                                                                                                                      
20 See infra notes 198–267 and accompanying text. 
21 See Keiter, supra note 16, at 314–15 (noting that recent fires have disrupted historical 
ecological patterns); John B. Loomis & Robert Richardson, Economic Values of the U.S. Wil-
derness System, Int’l J. of Wilderness, Apr. 2001, at 31, 31–33 (listing several ecological 
benefits of forests). 
22 See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fire Trespass Hand-
book 2 (2012) [hereinafter Fire Trespass Handbook]. 
23 See id. at v. Parties who intentionally set forest fires are also liable for incurred costs. 
Id. at iii. 
24 Id. at v. 
25 See United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2008); see also Fire 
Trespass Handbook, supra note 22, at iii. 
26 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8. 
27 See, e.g., State, Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation v. Mont. Power Co., 943 P.2d 
1251, 1252–53 (Mont. 1997) (utility company charged with negligence and negligence per 
se for forest fire arising from alleged violations of electrical safety code); Fire Insurance 
Exchange v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 34 Trials Digest 124, 1994 WL 847690 (1994) 
(utility company charged with neglecting to maintain vegetation clearance near power 
line, which led to a fire); Robert Thomas, Mary E. Vander Ploeg, Edward Lynch, Catana Sanchez, 
Lynn Gillmon, Richard J. Hodgkinson, Don W. Brown & Christina Larkin v. Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric, Hewlett Lee & Edwin Ellis, 38 Trials Digest 12361, 1991 WL 11254030 (1991) (utility 
company charged with negligence in inspecting and trimming trees near a power line, 
which led to a fire); see also United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1104 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding contractual indemnification clause as a valid basis for forest 
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These causes of action can be roughly divided into two types: statutory 
claims and common law claims.28 Although the line between these cat-
egories is sometimes blurred, a general rule is that the costs of sup-
pressing fires can only be recovered by statute, whereas damage to 
property is potentially subject to both statutory and common law.29 
A. Statutory Claims 
 If a fire burns national forest land and a civil lawsuit is filed, the 
government “stands in the shoes of any injured landowner” and may try 
to recover costs under applicable state law.30 The government can as-
sert any available statutory claims, as long as such claims do not conflict 
with federal policy or interests.31 In many cases, a state statute will allow 
the federal government to collect suppression costs, which are typically 
unrecoverable under the common law.32 
1. Applicable Statutes: A Survey 
 California Health and Safety Code §13009 is a typical example of a 
state statute that seeks to deter forest fires.33 The statute provides that 
any person who negligently or illegally starts a fire is liable for suppres-
                                                                                                                      
fire cause of action); Fire Trespass Handbook, supra note 22, at iii (“The [Bureau of 
Land Management] . . . shall pursue cost recovery for human-caused fires . . . when negli-
gence or intent has been established.”). 
28 See infra notes 30–92 and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 13007, 13009 (West 2006) (authorizing re-
covery for injuries to property caused by a fire, as well as recovery of fire suppression costs); 
Wis. Stat. § 26.14(9(b) (2012) (providing that any person setting a fire that spreads into a 
forest fire will be responsible for suppression costs); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13–21–105 (2012) 
(“If any person sets fire to any woods or prairie so as to damage any other person, such per-
son shall make satisfaction for the damage to the party injured.”); S. Ry. Co. v. Crowe, 366 
S.E.2d 846, 847­48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (deciding claim for forest fire damages under state 
common law). 
30 Norman J. Wiener, Uncle Sam and Forest Fires: His Rights and Responsibilities, 15 Envtl. 
L. 623, 626 (1985). 
31 Id.; see United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United 
States v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1974)) (“[W]here 
there has been no clear federal law to apply, federal courts have referred to state law to 
provide the appropriate rule.”). 
32 See United States v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1142­46 (E.D. Cal. 
2008) (dismissing the United States’ federal law claims against defendant, but allowing 
claims based on California Health and Safety Code); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 
750 F.2d 1077, 1080, (D. C. Cir. 1984) (noting general rule that emergency response costs 
cannot be recovered absent statutory authority); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Wis. Power & 
Light Co., 321 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Wis. 1982) (noting that liability for fire suppression costs 
must be imposed by statute, as there is no provision for recovery under common law). 
33 Health & Safety § 13009. 
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sion costs and emergency or rescue services.34 A broad range of liti-
gants have brought claims under the statute.35 
 Washington State’s current fire liability statute, Revised Code of 
Washington (RCW) § 76.04.495, allows Washington state, its municipal-
ities, and any fire protection agency of the United States to recover rea-
sonable suppression costs from parties whose negligence caused a for-
est fire.36 Prior to 1986, however, the statute did not explicitly say which 
parties could recover costs.37 RCW § 76.04.370 read in part: “If the state 
shall incur any expense from fire fighting made necessary [by a fire 
hazard], it may recover the cost thereof from the person responsible.”38 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of a federal government claim for 
fire suppression costs under this version of the statute, which was 
revised prior to the decision.39 
 Similarly, Utah’s former statute authorizing recovery of fire sup-
pression costs did not specify to which parties it applied.40 Prior to 
2012, Utah Code § 65A-3–4 read: “A person who negligently, recklessly, 
or intentionally causes or spreads a wildland fire shall be liable for the 
cost of suppressing that wildland fire.”41 The statute did not explicitly 
mention which parties could collect those costs.42 Utah Code § 65A-3–4 
was amended in 2012 and now explicitly applies to anyone incurring 
suppression costs: “A person who incurs costs to suppress a wildland fire 
may bring an action under this section to recover those costs.”43 The 
amendment was passed following litigation in which the United States 
was denied recovery of suppression costs for a fire on federal land.44 
                                                                                                                      
34 See id. 
35 See City & Cnty. of S.F., 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1142, 1144, 1144 n.4 (United States able to 
bring state law claims against San Francisco for fire arising from negligent maintenance of 
a utility pole); Giorgi v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 119, 120, 123 (Ct. App. 1968) 
(State of California and individual firemen brought suit against utility company for forest 
fire arising from negligence). 
36 See Wash. Rev. Code § 76.04.495(1) (1994). 
37 See id. § 76.04.370 (repealed 1986). 
38 See United States v. Burlington N., Inc., 500 F.2d 637, 639 n.1 (9th Cir. 1974) (quot-
ing § 76.04.370). 
39 See id. at 639, 641. 
40 See Utah Code Ann. § 65A-3–4 (West 2011) (repealed and re-enacted 2012). 
41 Id. 
42 See id; see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 16–32 (West 2011) (allowing collection of 
suppression costs from parties who “willfully or carelessly” cause a fire, payable to “gov-
ernmental units.”). 
43 Utah Code Ann. § 65A-3–4(3) (West 2012). 
44 See United States v. Rocky Mountain Power, No. 2:11-CV-00227, 2011 WL 3423383 *1, 
*3­4 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2011). 
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 Other areas of ambiguity include standards of liability.45 For ex-
ample, Wisconsin Statute § 26.14 provides in part, “Any person who sets 
a fire on any land [resulting in a forest fire] shall be liable for all ex-
penses incurred in the suppression of the fire by the state.”46 The liti-
gable question for this statute is whether the phrase “sets a fire” impos-
es strict, no-fault liability.47 
2. Statutory Litigation: Standing and Implied Culpability 
a. Ambiguous Statutes and Federal Standing 
 Under California Health and Safety Code §13009, the United 
States, the State of California, and private individuals have all been able 
to seek compensation for forest fires, including fires started by utility 
companies.48 The United States however, has faced standing hurdles in 
other states.49 In United States v. Burlington Northern, Inc., decided in 
1974, the Ninth Circuit denied the United States standing to sue under 
a Washington State statute—the precursor to RCW § 76.04.495—that 
allowed the State of Washington to collect suppression costs.50 The 
court reasoned that the statute granted an express cause of action to 
the state only, and that a narrow reading of the statute was appropriate 
because it created a cause of action separate from common law.51 Alt-
hough the United States had actually provided the fire-fighting services 
under a cooperative agreement with Washington, it could not recover 
its costs under the statute; the court held that federal claims under the 
statute must be subrogated to state claims, and the cooperative agree-
ment did not qualify as subrogation.52 
 United States v. Rocky Mountain Power, arising from a 2011 forest fire 
that burned 3571 acres of federal land, is a more recent example of the 
                                                                                                                      
45 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 26.14(9)(b) (2004) (providing that any person setting a fire 
that spreads into a forest fire will be responsible for suppression costs); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13–21–105 (“If any person sets fire to any woods or prairie so as to damage any other 
person, such person shall make satisfaction for the damage to the party injured.”). 
46 § 26.14(9)(b). 
47 See Wis. Power & Light Co., 321 N.W.2d at 288–89. 
48 See cases cited supra note 35. 
49 See Burlington, 500 F.2d at 639; Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *3­4. But 
see State v. Plum Creek Timber Co., No. CV03–297-N-EJL, 2005 WL 2415991 *1, *8 (D. 
Idaho Sept. 30, 2005) (allowing United States to recover fire suppression costs that were 
explicitly subrogated to costs incurred by the State of Idaho). 
50 500 F.2d at 639. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 638­39. 
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federal government’s standing problem under state forest fire stat-
utes.53 The United States sought fire suppression damages under Utah 
Code § 65A-3–4, which placed no explicit restrictions on who might 
bring claims under the statute.54 The U.S. District Court for the District 
of Utah, however, held that only the State of Utah, and not non-state 
actors, could recover suppression costs under § 65A-3–4.55 The Court’s 
holding rested on the underlying structure of the Code, and on the 
absence of any mention of the federal government in the statutory 
text.56 
 Restrictive statutory interpretations of fire statutes, as in Burlington 
Northern and Rocky Mountain Power, are not universally applied, howev-
er.57 Other District and Circuit Courts have held that the United States 
has authority to invoke similarly-worded forest fire statutes, even when 
the statute does not explicitly mention the United States.58 Thus in the 
1973 case United States v. Boone, the Tenth Circuit allowed the federal 
government to recover fire suppression costs under a Colorado statute 
that authorized “any . . . person” to collect damages from a fire-starter.59 
 In addition, the United States can sometimes circumvent its stand-
ing problem by entering into subrogation agreements with state agen-
cies, in which the United States pays for costs incurred by state firefight-
ers.60 A recent case allowed the United States to collect suppression 
costs under a cooperation agreement with the State of Idaho, which 
provided fire-fighting services that were paid for by the federal govern-
ment.61 The cooperation agreement also included express language de-
claring subrogation to state claims, aiding the United States’ case.62 
                                                                                                                      
53 2011 WL 3423383 at *1, *4. 
54 Id. at *1; see Utah Code Ann. §65A-3–4(1) (repealed and re-enacted 2012). 
55 Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *4. 
56 Id. at *3 (“Had the Utah legislature intended to allow the federal government to re-
cover its fire suppression costs . . . it could have easily included that language.”). 
57 See United States v. Boone, 476 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc., No. CV 08–3609 PA (AGRx), 2010 WL 1068413 *1, *2, *4 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 25, 2010); Plum Creek Timber Co., 2005 WL 2415991 at *8. 
58 See Boone, 476 F.2d at 278 (holding that United States was a “person” under language 
of governing statute); Merco Constr. Eng’rs, Inc., 2010 WL 1068413 at *2 (holding that Unit-
ed States could recover suppression costs under statute allowing recovery for “any damag-
es”); Plum Creek Timber Co., 2005 WL 2415991 at *8 (holding United States could recover 
suppression costs under statute allowing cost recovery for “the state [Idaho] or its author-
ized agencies.”). 
59 Boone, 476 F.2d at 277 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §41–2–5). 
60 See Plum Creek Timber Co., 2005 WL 2415991 at *8 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 
1467 (8th ed. 2004)). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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b. Ambiguous Statutes and Implied Culpability 
 Even when the United States can validly invoke a state statute to 
recover costs of a fire, there is an additional hurdle to overcome: the 
statute might require culpability on the part of the defendant.63 Even if 
there is no specific culpability requirement, many courts are reluctant 
to impose strict liability on fire-setters and will read an implicit re-
quirement of culpability into the statute.64 
 For instance, in Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Power & 
Light Company, decided in 1982, the State of Wisconsin attempted to 
recover fire suppression costs from a utility company after strong winds 
blew a tree onto a power line, which started a forest fire.65 The applica-
ble statute stated that “Any person who sets a fire on any land [resulting 
in a forest fire] shall be liable for all expenses incurred in the suppres-
sion of the fire by the state.”66 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin re-
fused to hold the utility company liable for the fire because the state 
could not show that the fire had been negligently set.67 Although the 
governing statute did not mention negligence, the Court was deter-
mined not to extend liability beyond what would be required by the 
common law.68 
 Most courts seem to endorse this rule, the notable exception being 
the Tenth Circuit.69 In Boone, the question of whether the United States 
could collect fire suppression costs without showing the defendant’s 
negligence was deemed a matter of statutory interpretation, and left 
open for the trial judge on remand.70 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Utah Code Ann. § 65A-3–4 (applying only in cases where a firestarter’s behavior 
is negligent, reckless, or intentional); Wash. Rev. Code § 76.04.495(1)(a) (requiring neg-
ligence for statute to apply). 
64 See, e.g., Wis. Power & Light Co., 321 N.W.2d at 289 (dismissing United States’ claim 
against utility where wind had blown a tree onto distribution lines, because utility did not 
“set” or “allow” the fire to spread under terms of the governing statute); Rocky Mountain 
Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *1­3 (fire caused by power line arcing was not a “prohibited 
act[] on state lands” under express terms of governing statute). 
65 321 N.W.2d at 288. 
66 Wis. Stat. §26.14(9)(b). 
67 Wis. Power & Light Co., 321 N.W.2d at 289. 
68 Id. at 288 (quoting Grube v. Moths, 202 N.W.2d 261, 267 (Wis. 1972)). 
69 See Boone, 476 F.2d at 278. 
70 Id. 
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B. Common-Law Tort Claims 
 The federal government may raise common law theories of liability 
in place of or in addition to any statutory claims.71 The general rule is 
that fire suppression costs, like other emergency services costs, cannot 
be recovered under the common law absent statutory authority.72 The 
government, however, may collect for damages to its land under theo-
ries of negligence, trespass, or nuisance.73 The government might have 
to resort to common law claims if a state forest fire statute makes no 
provision for property damage.74 If a defendant’s breach of a statutory 
duty results in a fire, the government may also try to invoke the doc-
trine of negligence per se, a separate standard of liability.75 
 Common law tort suits generally require fault on the part of the 
tortfeasor, unless the activity involved is so hazardous as to invoke strict 
liability.76 Courts have refused to apply strict liability to forest fires, and 
a utility fire is especially unlikely to trigger strict liability because elec-
tricity generation is vital to the community and as such is not normally 
considered an ultra-hazardous activity.77 Thus fires started by power 
lines most often involve questions of negligence.78 
 At common law, negligence involves either an act that a reasonable 
person would know creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, or a 
                                                                                                                      
71 Wiener, supra note 30, at 626­28. 
72 See Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d at 1080. 
73 Wiener, supra note 30, at 626­27. 
74 See Plum Creek Timber Co., 2005 WL 2415991 at *1, *8 (holding that claim for damag-
es to federal land from forest fire could be sought under common law theories rather than 
a fire suppression statute); see also Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *4 (noting 
that tort law generally allows recovery of costs for damage to property caused by negli-
gence of another). 
75 See Mont. Power Co., 943 P.2d at 1252–53 (negligence per se lawsuit against utility 
company, for alleged violation of electrical safety code leading to forest fire); Sullivan v. 
Mountain States Power Co., 9 P.2d 1038, 1046­48 (Or. 1932) (holding that violation of a 
statute requiring reasonable efforts to extinguish a fire was negligence per se); Wiener, 
supra note 30, at 628. 
76 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977). 
77 See Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838, 841–42 (Ohio 1988) (re-
jecting strict liability as a cause of action against a highly-regulated public utility); see also 
Smithbower v. Sw. Cent. Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 542 A.2d 140, 142–43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988) (holding that electrical transmission is not an abnormally dangerous activity subject 
to absolute liability, and noting that this is the majority rule in most states). 
78 See, e.g., City & Cnty of S.F., 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (alleging negligent maintenance 
of a utility pole as cause of forest fire); Giorgi, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 120, 123 (upholding state’s 
recovery for forest fire arising from defendant’s negligence); Mont. Power Co., 943 P.2d at 
1252 (upholding judgment for utility company in forest fire lawsuit, where negligence was 
not proven). 
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failure to act which breaches a duty of care toward others.79 Utilities 
have a high duty of care to the public and must take reasonable 
measures to prevent power line fires.80 In other contexts, a common-
law duty of care is often supplemented by state statutory law, which 
might conceivably create a “negligence per se” cause of action.81 Negli-
gence per se is a common law action arising from a violation of a stat-
ute that imposes a specific duty upon the tortfeasor: “Where a legisla-
tive enactment imposes upon any person a specific duty for the 
protection of others, and his neglect to perform that duty proximately 
results in injury to such another, he is negligent per se or as a matter of 
law.”82 
 Negligence per se is not automatically invoked any time a statute is 
violated—the duty created by the statute must be specific and clear, and 
the violation must be proximately related to plaintiff’s injury.83 In the 
2002 case Entex v. Gonzalez, a Texas court denied plaintiff’s negligence 
per se claim against a gas supplier for failure to warn of dangerous wa-
ter heater conditions, because the governing statute authorized but did 
not require the supplier to stop service to the heater.84 The Court held 
that the statute was inadequate to support negligence per se, because it 
did not prescribe any specific conduct.85 An additional barrier to negli-
gence per se is the burden of proving actual violation of a statute, 
which has proved difficult in more than one case involving utilities.86 
Conversely, while proof of meeting a minimum statutory standard of 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965). 
80 See Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Rys., 69 A.2d 90, 92 (Penn. 1949) (noting that the duty of 
a power line owner involves the very highest degree of care in avoiding injury to others). 
See also Scally v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (Ct. App. 1972) (holding that 
duty of electric company to maintain its right of way included preventing vegetation en-
croachment). 
81 See, e.g., Mont. Power, 943 P.2d at 1253 (negligence per se lawsuit brought under Na-
tional Electrical Safety Code); Wis. Admin. Code Pub. Serv. Comm’n § 113.0512 (2012) 
(“A utility not inspecting its lines or operations to [manage] hazardous trees . . . may be 
found negligent, and, therefore, responsible for payment of forest fire suppression costs 
. . . .”). 
82 Bede v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 18705, 2002 WL 1000400 *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. May 17, 2002) (quoting Eisenhuth v. Moneyhun, 119 N.E.2d 440, 440 (Ohio 1954)). 
83 Id. at *4 (quoting Zimmerman v. St. Peter’s Catholic Church, 622 N.E.2d 1184, 1191 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993)); see Mosteller v. Duke Energy Corp., 698 S.E.2d 424, 442 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2010) (denying negligence per se claim where defendant’s conduct was not proxi-
mate cause of injury). 
84 94 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. App. 2002). 
85 Id. at 9. 
86 See Mont. Power, 943 P.2d at 1254–55 (conflicting eyewitness testimony insufficient to 
prove utility company’s violation of maintenance standards); Mosteller, 698 S.E.2d at 442 
(determination of utility company’s violation must be explicitly made by state agency). 
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care eliminates a negligence per se charge, it is not completely disposi-
tive of defendant’s negligence.87 
 In common law negligence claims where negligence per se is not 
invoked, foreseeability is a commonly litigated factor.88 Foreseeability is 
crucial to the doctrine of proximate cause, which requires a party to be 
a reasonably direct cause of injury for tort liability to attach.89 In United 
States v. Southern California Edison Co., decided in 2006, a judge relied on 
the doctrine of proximate cause to deny summary judgment on a fire 
trespass claim arising after an unfortunate squirrel wandered into a 
transformer.90 Finally, there is a practical limitation on common-law 
negligence claims for forest fire damages: the difficulty of proving how 
a fire started.91 In this regard, however, government agencies are in an 
advantageous position because they can conduct fire investigations and 
gather evidence on their own to submit to a U.S. Attorney’s Office.92 
II. Damages to National Forests 
 If a forest fire occurs in a National Forest, the federal government 
will generally try to recover the cost of suppressing the fire (assuming 
the United States incurred such costs) and, importantly, the cost of any 
damage to its land.93 Recoverable land damages have become a conten-
                                                                                                                      
87 See Galloway v. Singing River Elec. Power Ass’n, 152 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss. 1963). 
88 See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (foreseeability of squirrel running 
into electrical transformer and igniting a forest fire was necessary factor in determining 
proximate cause of fire); Silver Falls Timber Co. v. E. & W. Lumber Co., 40 P.2d 703, 731–
33 (Or. 1935) (holding that spread of fire in windy, dry weather was foreseeable). 
89 See Restatement (First) of Torts § 431 (1934); see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 413 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1128 (noting that questions of foreseeability and proximate cause were related 
in case involving a forest fire). 
90 See 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (noting that the record was insufficient to determine 
foreseeability of the squirrel’s contact with the transformer). 
91 See Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: 
Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 Rich. J.L. & Tech., no. 4, 2010, at 
1, 2 (noting that fire investigation is often subjective and unscientific). 
92 See Fire Trespass Handbook, supra note 22, at 2, 4, 5. 
93 See, e.g., United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 829–30 (9th Cir. 
2012) (upholding award of fire suppression costs and intangible environmental damages 
to National Forest land); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138–39 
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (allowing federal government to claim damages for fire suppression costs, 
timber loss, reforestation costs, and loss of habitat and environmental services). Cost re-
covery for fire suppression is relatively well established. Under common law, the federal 
government can seek fire suppression costs only if its land has been threatened or dam-
aged, and only if said costs are “reasonably incurred.” See People ex rel. Grijalva v. Superior 
Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting People v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 128 
Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1976)); Wiener, supra note 30, at 634. 
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tious issue in recent litigation.94 Forest fires can present unique chal-
lenges to a determination of recoverable damages because forest land 
can be difficult to value.95 In addition, many cases involving forest fires 
are settled before damages are awarded, which slows the development 
of legal precedent.96 Cases that have been fully litigated have, however, 
shed light on the scope of recoverable damages from forest fires in Cal-
ifornia.97 Moreover, a large body of state law has developed around re-
coverable damages to trees, which has obvious importance to forest fire 
litigation.98 
 This Part will first examine the law of injury to trees—the most tan-
gible assets on forest land—and the three basic methods of recovery: 
diminution of property value, compensation for loss of timber, and res-
toration costs.99 It will then turn to compensation for less tangible losses, 
including injury to soil, habitat, scenery, and recreational interests.100 
The law of these non-economic environmental injuries is still in flux, but 
much has been written about them from a theoretical perspective.101 
A. Recoverable Damages for Injury to Trees: Diminution of Property, Timber 
Compensation, and Restoration Costs 
1. Diminution of Property and Compensation for Lost Timber 
 In the absence of a clear federal standard, recoverable damages to 
property—including damages to trees—are generally governed by state 
                                                                                                                      
94 See CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 829–30 (upholding $28 million award for envi-
ronmental injuries arising from forest fire); Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39 (allow-
ing federal government to claim damages for burned forest land). 
95 See Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929) 
(holding that recovery for damage to forest land, which has no market value, is not re-
stricted by normal rules for calculating damages); Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (not-
ing that no real estate market exists for government forest land). 
96 See, e.g., Bulwa, supra note 8; Ellis, supra note 8. 
97 See CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 830 (upholding award for intangible harm to the 
environment arising from forest fire); Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (“Plaintiff may 
recover damages for its separate injuries to the trees, to the soil and pre-merchantible tim-
ber, and its loss of use of habitat and environmental services during the period of forest 
regrowth.”). 
98 See, e.g., Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106–09 (Ct. App. 1980); Evenson v. Lil-
ley, 228 P.3d 420, 422–24 (Kan. App. 2010); Keitges v. VanDermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 140–
43 (Neb. 1992); Slappo v. J’s Dev. Assocs., Inc., 791 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). 
99 See infra notes 102–141 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 142–167 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 168–197 and accompanying text. 
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law.102 Some states enact statutes to govern damages;103 other states 
govern damages via the common law.104 Whether statutory or judicial, 
the unifying purpose of damages law is making an injured party 
whole.105 Compensation should place the injured party in the position 
that he or she would have occupied had the injury not occurred.106 
Thus, several states have adopted a general rule that damages for injury 
to trees are determined by the diminution in value of the land on 
which the trees stand—the difference in fair market value before and 
after the injury.107 
 When burned or damaged trees themselves have calculable market 
value, this value may serve as an alternative basis for compensation.108 
                                                                                                                      
102 See United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
City & Cnty. of S.F., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144 (E.D. Cal. 2006). This is true even when the 
United States brings suit in federal court. 655 F.2d at 917. 
103 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 7552 (2003) (“When agricultural or forest products 
have been destroyed or carried away, the owner may recover as damages either the value of 
the lost products themselves or the diminution in value of the real estate as a whole result-
ing from the violation, whichever is greater.); Cal. Civ. Code § 3333 (West 1997) (“For the 
breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages . . . is the 
amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby.”). 
104 See Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 140–42 (giving an overview of damages law for injury to 
trees in various jurisdictions). 
105 See Evenson, 228 P.3d 420 at 422 (“The underlying purpose of any measure of dam-
ages in a tort action is to make the injured party whole again.”) 
106 See Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 142 (quoting “L” Investments, Ltd. v. Lynch, 322 N.W.2d 
651, 656 (Neb. 1982)) (“[T]he principle underlying allowance of damages is to place the 
injured party in the same position, so far as money can do it, as he would have been had 
there been no injury or breach of duty.”); Henderson v. Nielsen, 871 P.2d 495, 500 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1994) (“As a general rule, the function of tort damages is to compensate the injured 
party for its loss.”). 
107 See, e.g., Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (noting that as a general rule, diminu-
tion in property value is the measure of damages for injury to productive trees); Hassoldt v. 
Patrick Media Grp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 672 (Ct. App. 2000) (“The usual measure of 
damages in a case involving damage to a tree is the difference between the value of the 
real property before and after the injury.”); Slappo, 791 A.2d at 419 (“Generally, the meas-
ure of damage for removal of standing timber is the diminution in the market value of the 
land.”); Pehrson v. Saderup, 498 P.2d 648, 649–51 (Utah 1972) (upholding diminution of 
property value as basis for damages from loss of lilac bushes). 
108 See, e.g., Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (allowing damages claim for market 
value of burned timber); Jones v. Sanitary Dist. of Chi., 97 N.E. 211, 214 (Ill. 1911) (hold-
ing that measure of damages for lost forest trees was value of trees as timber); Slappo, 791 
A.2d at 419 (noting that when injured trees have market value, damages may be awarded 
based on that value). Some jurisdictions will not account for appreciation when calculating 
the market value of timber. Compare Knox Entrs. v. Timbermen, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 834, 836 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for future growth of harvest-
ed trees), and Terry v. Butler, 123 So. 2d 865, 871 (holding that young, unmatured timber 
is not a “growing crop” for the purpose of calculating damages), with Nielsen, 871 P.2d at 
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In the 2008 case United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, a California court 
allowed the federal government to seek damages for the market value 
of lost timber burned in a forest fire, rather than limiting damages to 
diminution of value in the land.109 Defendant railroad was charged with 
negligently causing the 2000 “Storrie Fire,” which burned more than 
fifty thousand acres of nationally owned forest.110 The governing stat-
ute, California Health and Safety Code § 13007, provides that persons 
who willfully or negligently allow fire to affect the property of another 
are “liable to the owner of such property for any damages to the prop-
erty caused by the fire.”111 The court interpreted the clause allowing 
any damages broadly and allowed the plaintiff to seek the full market 
value of the burned timber, assessed at $121,916,774 by the plaintiff’s 
experts.112 The court based its holding in part on the fact that no real 
estate market value exists for National Forests, making the diminution 
in value standard inappropriate.113 
 The court also addressed the question of whether the government 
could recover the market value of burnt timber that could not be sold 
under federal law.114 Part of the land burnt in Union Pacific was desig-
nated as a wilderness area, on which commercial logging was prohibit-
ed.115 Defendants argued that the recoverable damages for that area 
should be limited because the land’s timber could not be sold.116 In-
stead, the Court reasoned that the protected status of the land was evi-
dence of greater value.117 In lieu of a quantified market value for the 
Wilderness area, the court allowed the United States to seek the full 
market value of the burnt timber.118 
                                                                                                                      
501 (interpreting a prior decision as favoring a measure of damages that allowed for fore-
seeable appreciation of young trees). 
109 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. 
110 Id. 
111 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13007 (West 2012). 
112 Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1143, 1146. 
113 Id. In justifying the unique treatment of national forest land, the court referenced a 
1929 Ninth Circuit ruling in which the United States was allowed to recover the market 
value of burned timber, as well as restoration costs for young trees, after a forest fire. Id. at 
1144; see Feather Lumber, 30 F.2d at 644. 
114 Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1146–47. 
115 Id. at 1146. 
116 Id. at 1146–47. 
117 Id. at 1147 (“Congress has elected to preserve certain NFS [National Forest Ser-
vice] lands in an unharvested state. . . . These decisions reflect federal policy that such NFS 
lands have a higher public worth than simply the present value of their timber.”) 
118 Id. 
248 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41:233 
2. Restoration Costs 
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a different method of cal-
culating damages: In appropriate cases, an injured party may claim the 
actual cost of restoring property to its previous condition.119 In some 
jurisdictions, restoration costs can be used to compensate for injuries to 
trees that have little or no market value.120 Restoration damages for 
trees are, however, subject to a number of limitations.121 Some courts 
will not allow restoration damages to exceed diminution in value of the 
property.122 In addition, restoration damages are sometimes allowed 
only to the extent that the costs are “reasonable.”123 Finally, restoration 
damages may be precluded in certain jurisdictions absent sufficient ev-
idence showing the value of the damaged trees.124 
 Restoration damages are sometimes utilized to capture non-
marketable qualities of trees, including their aesthetic or personal val-
ue.125 In Keitges v. VanDermeulen, decided in 1992, plaintiffs sought resto-
ration costs for roughly one hundred trees that defendant had bull-
dozed in an attempt to build a fence.126 Plaintiffs used these trees for 
family “nature hikes” and “nature study.”127 The Supreme Court of Ne-
braska held that plaintiffs could seek restoration costs, even though the 
trees had been used solely for recreational purposes.128 The court re-
                                                                                                                      
119 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 (1979) (stating that damages may consist 
of restoration costs in appropriate circumstances). 
120 See S. Ry. Co. v. Crowe, 366 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing landown-
er to collect replanting costs for young trees with little commercial value). 
121 See Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 106–09; Evenson, 228 P.3d at 424; Keitges, 483 N.W.2d 
at 143; Pehrson, 498 P.2d at 650. 
122 See Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 143. 
123 Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 108; see also Evenson, 228 P.3d at 424 (holding restoration 
costs unreasonable where they exceeded twice the highest estimate of the property prior to 
injury); Pehrson, 498 P.2d at 650 (finding claimed restoration costs for damage to lilac 
bushes to be unreasonable). 
124 See Evenson, 228 P.3d at 423 (holding that restoration damages require competent 
evidence as to value of trees); see also Slappo, 791 A.2d at 419 (denying restoration costs 
after evidence of the value of damaged trees was excluded). 
125 See Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (“In recent years, ‘courts throughout the country 
have placed a greater emphasis on the rights of a property owner to enjoy the aesthetic 
value of trees and shrubbery . . . . ’”) (quoting Rector v. C.S. McCrossan, 235 N.W.2d 609, 
610 (Minn. 1975)); Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 143 (“[T]he landowner’s attempted recovery for 
[damaged trees] should not be entirely frustrated by the fact that the market does not 
reflect his personal loss.”). But see Pehrson, 498 P.2d at 649–51 (denying restoration damag-
es for aesthetic value of lilac bushes on rental property). 
126 483 N.W.2d at 139. 
127 Id. at 143. 
128 Id. The court added that the restoration costs could not exceed the market value of 
plaintiffs’ land prior to the injury. Id. 
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jected defendant’s argument that damages should be limited to the 
diminution in value to the land.129 Other jurisdictions have likewise al-
lowed recovery for non-commercial value of trees, either through resto-
ration, or, if that is impractical, through monetary compensation.130 To 
avoid excessive damage awards, however, recovery for non-commercial 
uses is often limited by a reasonableness requirement.131 
 Restoration costs for non-marketable trees have been sought by 
the government after fires in National Forests.132 The case of Union Pa-
cific exemplifies this approach.133 In Union Pacific, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California allowed the federal gov-
ernment to seek broad damages in forest fire litigation—not just com-
pensation for lost timber, but restoration costs for seedlings with no 
market value.134 The court reasoned that the damage to the young and 
mature trees included separate, identifiable injuries, each of which fell 
under the language of California’s general tort statute.135 The court 
also considered it significant that plaintiffs were not asking to restore 
old growth forests, but seedlings only, which would be substantially less 
expensive.136 
 Landowners may recover restoration costs after a forest fire even in 
the absence of statutory authority.137 In Southern Railway Co. v. Crowe, 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia in 1988 allowed a landowner to recov-
er the restoration costs of twenty thousand two-year-old seedlings dam-
aged by a forest fire, in addition to diminution in the value of her en-
                                                                                                                      
129 Id. 
130 See Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 108–09 (listing several cases granting recovery of res-
toration costs for aesthetic value of trees); Samson Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 147 A.2d 
430, 435 (Md. 1958). 
131 See Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (holding cost of restoring trees to be unreasona-
bly high, and remanding to determine whether cost of restoring vegetative undergrowth 
would be reasonable); Pehrson, 498 P.2d at 650 (holding that reasonableness requirement 
limits restoration damages based on personal value). But see Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, 
Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 40–41 (Ct. App. 2009) (upholding jury award of substantial res-
toration damages for burned property, where property had no market value). 
132 See, e.g., Feather Lumber, 30 F.2d at 644 (upholding award of restoration costs for 
young trees after a forest fire); Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39 (allowing damage 
claims for lost value of marketable timber plus reforestation costs for immature, non-
commercial trees). 
133 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39. 
134 Id. at 1150. 
135 Id. at 1145. (“[T]o fully compensate the government for injury to such protected 
forest lands, it must be permitted to recover for its separate and identifiable injuries.”); see 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3333. 
136 See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51 (holding that reforestation costs were not 
unreasonable as a matter of law). 
137 See Crowe, 366 S.E.2d at 847–48. 
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tire forest parcel, which also contained mature timber.138 The court 
noted the trial judge’s care in allowing restoration costs only for seed-
lings, and not for the mature, marketable trees on plaintiff’s land, 
which were folded into the overall value of the property, their loss fac-
toring into the diminution of the property’s value.139 An additional 
award of restoration costs for the marketable trees would have repre-
sented impermissible double recovery, as plaintiff would have needed 
to replant after any sale regardless of whether or not there had been a 
fire.140 The same court had previously reversed an award of damages 
that included both the market value of unlawfully cut timber and the 
cost of replanting it.141 
B. Environmental Damages: Soil, Scenery, Habitat, and Other  
Non-Economic Injury 
 Forest fires in National Forests harm more than just timber.142 
Fires can destroy vegetation that is needed to prevent erosion, decimate 
animal habitats, and ruin the scenic beauty of wilderness.143 Sometimes 
these injuries are even more significant than tree loss.144 Placing an 
economic value on such environmental harm, however, is challeng-
ing.145 One method is to quantify the environmental benefits that socie-
                                                                                                                      
138 Id. 
139 See id. at 848. 
140 See id. (“[T]he costs of replanting after timber has been removed is part of normal 
business costs which are borne by the landowner.”). 
141 See Henderson v. Easters, 345 S.E.2d 42, 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); see also Knox Entrs., 
450 S.E.2d at 837(holding that plaintiff could not recover for future growth of harvested 
trees, and distinguishing Crowe as involving two types of injury, to marketable and non-
marketable timber respectively). 
142 For example, the Copper Fire of 2002 burned eighteen thousand acres of National 
Forest, destroyed 90% of the endangered California Red-Legged Frog habitat, and dam-
aged a historically significant mining site. CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 831–32. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 832, 837 (upholding a jury award that was largely devoted to remedy of in-
tangible environmental damages). 
145 See Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in Natural Re-
source Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1030 
(1995) (“The subtle relationship between environmental systems and the uses provided by 
those systems . . . is not readily grasped by the relative crudeness of the legal system. . . . As 
such, natural resource damage valuation is not always an easy task.”); Frank B. Cross, Natu-
ral Resource Damage Valuation, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 269, 280 (1989) [hereinafter Cross, Damage 
Valuation] (examining difficulty of determining compensable value of natural resources); 
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals 
Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1985) (evaluating damage to the envi-
ronment is problematic); Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with 
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ty gains from environmental resources, such as active forests.146 A looser 
approach has recently emerged in case law: In 2012, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld an award of intangible, non-economic environmental damages 
from a jury that had not been provided with explicit quantification of 
forest benefits, but instead took into account the “nature and charac-
ter” of the damaged forest.147 The breadth of allowable damages for 
forest fires is obviously important to public utilities, which filed an ami-
cus brief supporting defendant’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit.148 Outside 
of the courtroom, the problem of evaluating environmental damages 
has been contentious, and a body of literature has developed around 
the issue.149 
1. Environmental Damages: Recent Rulings in California and the 
Ninth Circuit 
 In Union Pacific, discussed in Part II-A, the federal government 
sought compensation for injuries arising after a forest fire burned more 
than fifty thousand acres of National Forest.150 In addition to damages 
for lost timber, the government sought recovery for loss of forest ser-
                                                                                                                      
Natural Resource Damages, 32 Envtl. L. 57, 60 (2002) (noting that natural resource damag-
es are problematic due to lack of evidentiary certainty). 
146 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 43–44 (analyzing Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) 
as a method of quantifying environmental damage to forests). The United States made use 
of HEA in litigation following the Storrie Fire of 2000. See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 
1151–52. Contingent Valuation, the process of surveying people in an attempt to monetize 
environmental benefits, has also been used in litigation. See Binger et al., supra note 145 at 
1034; Sameer H. Doshi, Making the Sale on Contingent Valuation, 21 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 295, 
296–97 (2008). 
147 CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 837–38 (“[T]he government in this case did not 
‘elicit any testimony that put a dollar amount on the intangible environmental damag-
es’. . . . Evidence about the ‘nature and character’ of the damaged National Forest envi-
ronment provided a rational way for the jury to calculate the award.”). 
148 See Brief for S. Cal. Edison Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at *I, 
*25–26, CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d 827 (No. 10–55371), 2010 WL 6791269. Tree-
trimming companies also provided amicus briefs. See CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 833. 
149 See Edward J. Yang et al., The Use of Economic Analysis in Valuing Natural 
Resource Damages 71–77 (1984) (analyzing government’s legal responsibilities for natu-
ral resources held in trust, and ramifications for damages); Cross, Damage Valuation, supra 
note 145 at 280–81 (listing three types of natural resource values, both economic and non-
economic, that could be compensable); Stone, supra note 145 at 23–33 (assessing possibil-
ity of granting legal interests to natural resources); Thompson, supra note 145, at 88 (argu-
ing that restoration costs for lost natural resource services would be an effective way to 
calculate natural resource damages); see also Kimball, supra note 7, at 44 (“[C]hanging 
public values may signal a need to modify the traditional evaluation of damages caused by 
forest fires.”). 
150 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. 
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vices such as scenic use, recreational use, and wildlife habitat.151 To 
quantify this loss, the government utilized a method called Habitat 
Equivalency Analysis (HEA).152 HEA is a multi-step process, the core 
idea of which is to compensate for loss in one location by quantifying 
an “equivalent service” that would make up for the loss in a different 
location.153 In Union Pacific, the government’s expert conducted the 
analysis by calculating losses based on the diameter of full-grown tree 
trunks, and then using the cost of brush clearing as an equivalent ser-
vice.154 The trial court permitted the government to seek damages 
based on this method.155 
 The Ninth Circuit further expanded the potential cost recovery 
from forest fires in the 2012 case United States v. CB&I Constructors, 
Inc.156 In 2002, defendant CB&I negligently sparked a fire that burned 
roughly eighteen thousand acres of the Angeles National Forest.157 The 
fire destroyed a large swath of land serving as the habitat of the endan-
gered California Red-Legged Frog.158 It also caused severe damage to a 
historic mining camp, which subsequently had to be de-listed from the 
National Register of Historic Places.159 A jury awarded the United 
States substantial costs for environmental, “non-economic” damage in 
addition to resource, restoration, and fire suppression costs.160 The Dis-
trict Court sustained the award despite multiple challenges,161 and the 
case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.162 The Ninth Circuit then up-
held the award of environmental costs, despite their “intangible,” “non-
economic” nature.163 
 Non-economic environmental damages have been seen in contexts 
outside of forest fire litigation, most notably under statutory causes of 
                                                                                                                      
151 Id. at 1151–52. 
152 Id. at 1151 n.26. 
153 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 43. 
154 Id. 
155 See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. The government had also utilized HEA in 
litigating an earlier forest fire; that litigation was settled prior to trial. See Kimball, supra 
note 7, at 38–39, 43. 
156 685 F.3d at 837. 
157 Id. at 829. 
158 Id. at 831. 
159 Id. at 831–32. 
160 Id. at 832. The intangible, non-economic costs sought by the United States ended 
up comprising the lion’s share of the award: The jury awarded more than $28 million in 
environmental costs versus $7.6 million in suppression costs. Id. 
161 Id. at 832–33 (quoting the trial court’s denial of CB & I’s Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial or Remittitur). 
162 CB & I Constructors, 685 F.3d at 833. 
163 Id. at 837. 
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action.164 In the seminal case of Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, decided 
in 1989, the D.C. Circuit held that recovery of natural resource losses 
under a federal statute included non-market losses.165 The court also 
endorsed contingent valuation—the practice of surveying the public to 
generate monetary estimates of resource values—as a reasonable way to 
assess non-use damages.166 State laws may also provide a basis for recov-
ery of environmental damages, but are inconsistent across jurisdictions, 
and often apply only to certain categories of injuries, such as oil 
spills.167 
2. A Theoretical Basis for Environmental Damages 
 Many scholars have identified the need for a comprehensive theory 
of environmental damages, as economic recovery cannot capture the 
full value of natural resources.168 Frank L. Cross provides a useful 
framework in his 1989 article Natural Resource Damage Valuation, dividing 
the value of natural resources into three categories: use value, existence 
value, and intrinsic value.169 Use value reflects the worth of natural re-
sources to humans, from both consumption (e.g., fishing), and non-
consumptive uses (e.g. birdwatching or hiking).170 Existence value and 
intrinsic value ascribe non-use worth to natural resources, whether for 
their symbolic importance to humans (existence value, e.g., the value of 
the Grand Canyon or of endangered species), or simply for their inher-
ent worth independent of human sensibilities (intrinsic value).171 
 The concept of the intrinsic value of resources was given embryon-
ic form by Christopher D. Stone of the University of Southern Califor-
nia.172 In a 1985 article, Stone explored the possibility of granting legal 
interests—most notably, a legal right of intactness—to natural resources 
                                                                                                                      
164 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607(a) (2006) (providing liability for damages arising 
from loss of natural resources); Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (holding that natural resource damages recovered under statute cannot be lim-
ited to economic use value). 
165 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 463–64 (“Neither the statute nor its 
legislative history evinces any congressional intent to limit use values to market prices. . . . 
Market valuation can of course serve as one factor to be considered, but by itself it will 
necessarily be incomplete.”). 
166 Id. at 474–81. 
167 See Cross, Damage Valuation, supra note 145, at 279–80. 
168 See sources cited supra note 149. 
169 See Cross, Damage Valuation, supra note 145 at 280–81. 
170 See id. at 281. 
171 See id. at 285–93. 
172 See Stone, supra note 145, at 26–34. 
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such as rivers and trees.173 Stone concluded that granting absolute legal 
interests to natural resources would be too inflexible, and that the con-
cept could be implemented only if flexible legal boundaries were de-
veloped and enforced.174 As an example, mandatory restoration costs 
for pollution might be justifiable if such costs were subject to a statutory 
cap.175 
 Stone, Cross, and other advocates for recovery for environmental 
damages have recognized the need for an economic valuation method 
even in cases where the legal system ascribes intrinsic worth to natural 
resources.176 Nevertheless, the attempt to quantify non-economic envi-
ronmental damages has proved to be controversial regardless of the 
method used.177 For example, the federal government’s use of HEA in 
Union Pacific was criticized by commentators, who pointed out the nu-
merous problems with applying HEA to forest fires.178 HEA is heavily 
dependent on input values—the initial selection of a metric for loss 
and an equivalent service greatly affects the final calculation of damag-
es.179 Because of this, HEA can be arbitrary in practice.180 HEA also 
works best when applied to relatively simple injuries; forest fires, which 
result in the loss of multiple services, may be too complicated to ana-
lyze.181 Finally, combining HEA with damages for loss of merchantable 
timber might result in double recovery, as any sale of timber could re-
sult in the same type of damage to scenery sought under HEA.182 
                                                                                                                      
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 31–32. 
175 See id. 
176 See Cross, Damage Valuation, supra note 145, at 331–32; Stone, supra note 145, at 31–
32; Thompson, supra note 145, at 87–88. 
177 See Binger et al., supra note 145, at 1032–34 (listing general drawbacks of contin-
gent valuation); Frank B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U. Tol. 
L. Rev. 319, 328–32 (1993) [hereinafter Cross, Restoration] (listing drawbacks of contingent 
valuation, and concluding it is not reliable enough for legal use); Kimball, supra note 7, at 
44 (examining drawbacks of using HEA after forest fires). 
178 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 44; see also Richard Dunford et al., The Use of Habitat 
Equivalency Analysis in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 48 Ecological Econ. 61, 68 
(2004). 
179 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 44. 
180 See id. (comparing divergent HEA analysis of two forest fires by same analyst). 
181 See id. (citing Dr. Richard Dunford’s opinion that HEA works best when there is on-
ly one affected service). 
182 Id. at 44–45. 
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 Contingent valuation (CV), an alternative method of calculating 
environmental damages, has also been subject to criticism.183 CV relies 
on survey data, but the subjects of the survey might not have detailed 
knowledge of natural resources systems.184 In addition, because the 
survey questions are hypothetical, respondents will not have a tangible 
commitment to their answers.185 Critics charge that CV leads to irra-
tionally high valuation of resources.186 In practice, courts have some-
times chosen to exclude CV surveys as uncertain and unscientific.187 
 Some scholars have suggested that restoration costs should repre-
sent the value of environmental damages.188 Restoration costs have 
been more widely accepted by courts than other methods of evaluating 
environmental damage.189 Restoration is also subject to limitation by 
judicial discretion—in some cases, “restoration” to a new condition is a 
more cost-effective option than restoration to a previous environmental 
baseline.190 Finally, courts have found restoration costs to complement 
the government’s role as a public trustee for federal land.191 
 Other methods of quantifying forest value have developed outside 
of the legal arena.192 Researchers have identified several categories of 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Binger et al., supra note 145, at 1032–34 (listing general drawbacks of contin-
gent valuation); Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 328–32 (listing drawbacks of contin-
gent valuation, and concluding it is not reliable enough for legal use). 
184 See Binger et al., supra note 145, at 1032; Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 329. 
185 See Binger et al., supra note 145, at 1032–33. 
186 See id.; Thompson, supra note 145, at 85 (CV survey produced an estimate of $305 
million for harm to fish population, where millions of fish still existed further along the 
California coast). 
187 See Thompson, supra note 145, at 78–84 (examining two cases in which CV studies 
were excluded as evidence). 
188 See Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 321; Thompson, supra note 145, at 87–88 
(“Experience with [natural resource damages] cases offers support for the first principle 
. . . that damages should be based on the costs of restoration.”). 
189 See Thompson, supra note 145, at 60 (comparing judicial acceptance of restoration 
costs to controversy over CV). 
190 See Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 333–34; cf. Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 
1150–51 (granting restoration costs after forest fire for seedlings only, rather than for all 
injured trees, and relying on HEA to recover a portion of non-restoration costs); Heninger, 
162 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (remanding to determine whether restoration of shrubs and under-
brush, rather than full restoration of damaged trees, would be reasonable). 
191 See Yang et al., supra note 149, at 75–77. 
192 See Robert N. Stavins & Kenneth R. Richards, The Cost of U.S. Forest-Based 
Carbon Sequestration at ii, 24–33 (2005); Michael C. Blumm & Tim Wigington, The 
Oregon & California Railroad Grant Lands’ Sordid Past, Contentious Present, and Uncertain Fu-
ture: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 67–69 (2013); Loomis & Richard-
son, supra note 21, at 31–33. 
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economic value arising out of wilderness areas, including vast forests.193 
These categories include recreation value, scientific value, and ecologi-
cal value.194 Forests are particularly beneficial from an ecological 
standpoint: Wilderness forests are estimated to yield $1 billion in annu-
al benefits from climate regulation, and can also generate value from 
watershed protection and nutrient cycling.195 Additionally, the estimat-
ed cost of using forests for carbon sequestration is comparable to other 
climate change mitigation options.196 Because forests have so many 
tangible ecological benefits, scholars have identified restoration as an 
important aspect of any environmental protection plan.197 
III. Resolving Utility-Based Forest Fires: The Path Forward 
 Because forest fire litigation is primarily a matter of state law, it is 
unsurprising that a rift has developed regarding the type and amount 
of costs that the United States can recover after a fire.198 Two main 
points of contention are: (1) Whether the federal government can re-
cover fire suppression costs under state statutes that do not explicitly 
list the United States as a party; and (2) how damages to federal forest 
land should be calculated.199 This Note first argues that the United 
States should be able to recover fire suppression costs under ambiguous 
statutes, and that negligence is the appropriate standard of liability for 
forest fires under these statutes and under common law.200 It then ar-
gues that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are correct to allow 
broad damages for forest fires in National Forests, and that restoration 
                                                                                                                      
193 See Blumm & Wigington, supra note 192, at 67–69; Loomis & Richardson, supra 
note 21, at 31–33. 
194 Loomis & Richardson, supra note 21, at 32. Five other value categories are Com-
munity, Passive Use, Biodiversity, Off-Site Use, and Education. Id. at 31. 
195 Id. at 33; see also Blumm & Wigington, supra note 192, at 68 (noting that the City of 
Portland has benefited economically from forest watershed protection). 
196 See Stavins & Richards, supra note 192, at ii, 24–33 (summarizing and synthesizing 
previous studies on the potential cost of carbon sequestration in forests); see also Blumm & 
Wigington, supra note 192, at 69 (noting that forest systems provide carbon sequestration 
value). Using forests for future carbon sequestration would cost between $30 and $90 per 
ton. Stavins & Richards, supra. 
197 See Keiter, supra note 16, at 320–21 (noting that the need for restoration efforts is 
not controversial); Kimball, supra note 7, at 45 (noting that restoration of damaged forests 
is a key objective of the U.S. Forest Service). 
198 See supra notes 22–196 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 22–196 and accompanying text. 
200 See infra notes 202–222 and accompanying text. 
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damages can be a useful future tool to evaluate loss of environmental 
assets and services.201 
A. Statutory Cost Recovery and Common-Law Liability: Adopting a Universal 
Negligence Standard for Forest Fires 
 Interpretation of state statutes governing recovery of fire suppres-
sion costs varies by jurisdiction, even when statutes contain similar lan-
guage.202 Thus the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit allowed 
the United States to recover suppression costs under a statute that 
granted recovery to “any person,”203 but the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah held that a statute ordering payment of suppression 
costs did not apply to the United States, despite similar ambiguous lan-
guage.204 
 For both legal and policy reasons, the United States should be able 
to recover suppression costs under state fire-recovery statutes.205 Such 
statutes often include broad language allowing recovery by “any per-
son,”206 or requiring payment of any suppression costs.207 A general rule 
of statutory construction, which the Supreme Court articulated in 1917, 
is that the plain meaning of a statute represents prima facie evidence of 
legislative intent.208 Under the “plain meaning” rule, then, the normal, 
broad meaning of “any” in fire suppression statutes should prevail unless 
it leads to an absurd result.209 Allowing the United States to collect sup-
pression costs is not absurd, but rational: If the United States is unable 
                                                                                                                      
201 See infra notes 223–267 and accompanying text. 
202 Compare United States v. Burlington N., Inc., 500 F.2d 637, 638 n.1, 639 (9th Cir. 
1974), and United States v. Rocky Mountain Power, No. 2:11-CV-00227, 2011 WL 3423383 
at *1–4 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2011), with United States v. Boone, 476 F.2d 276, 277–78 (10th 
Cir. 1973), and State v. Plum Creek Timber Co., No. CV03–297-N-EJL, 2005 WL 2415991 
*1, *7–8 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2005). 
203 Boone, 476 F.2d at 277–78 (holding that United States was a “person” under lan-
guage of governing statute). 
204 Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *1–4. 
205 See, e.g., Boone, 476 F.2d at 278. 
206 E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13007 (West 2012). 
207 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 65A-3–4 (West 2011) (repealed and re-enacted 2012). 
208 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (“[T]he language being 
plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evi-
dence of the ultimate legislative intent.”) 
209 See id. (noting that the plain meaning rule might not apply if it leads to absurd con-
sequences). It is easier to justify federal exclusion from statutes that define a narrow class 
of litigants. See Burlington, 500 F.2d at 639 (excluding United States from collecting under 
Washington statute naming the State of Washington as payee of suppression costs). 
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to collect suppression costs, the loss shifts away from the tortfeasor and 
onto the public at large, which is poor public policy.210 
 Courts that have excluded the federal government from state cost 
recovery statutes have generally done so in cases where the United 
States sought to impose liability without fault.211 Their reluctance is 
understandable. It is true, as scholars have noted, that at some level 
forest fires will inevitably arise from normal business operations on for-
est land, despite precautions.212 Yet no-fault liability is typically reserved 
only for activities that are ultra-hazardous.213 Courts have repeatedly 
refused to hold that public utilities engage in ultra-hazardous activities, 
and this common law rule should not be overturned in the context of 
fire suppression costs.214 
 Similarly, attempts to establish a separate standard of liability via 
negligence per se claims should be met with skepticism.215 Negligence 
per se requires a nexus between breach of a statutory duty and inju-
ry.216 Courts have not found an explicit statutory duty imposed on pub-
lic utilities that would result in a forest fire if breached.217 
                                                                                                                      
210 It is telling that the statutes considered in Burlington Northern and Rocky Mountain 
Power, which were interpreted to deny the United States the ability to collect suppression 
costs under state law, were both amended to allow broader recovery. See Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 76.04.495(1) (2012) (allowing any fire protection agency of the United States to recover 
reasonable suppression costs from negligent parties); Utah Code Ann. § 65A-3–4(3) 
(West 2012) (“A person who incurs costs to suppress a wildland fire may bring an action 
under this section to recover those costs.”); supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
211 See Burlington, 500 F.2d at 640 (Refusing to impose strict liability for alleged negli-
gence per se violation); Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *4–5 (holding that 
ambiguously-worded statute does not imply strict liability). 
212 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 42; Schulz, supra note 7, at 21. 
213 Strict liability generally attaches to abnormally dangerous activities. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977). 
214 See, e.g., sources cited at note 77, supra. 
215 See State, Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation v. Mont. Power Co., 943 P.2d 1251, 
1252, 1254–55 (Mont. 1997) (upholding judgment for utility company in forest fire lawsuit 
where there was insufficient evidence of statutory violation); see also Mosteller v. Duke En-
ergy Corp., 698 S.E.2d 424, 442–43 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (denying negligence per se claim 
where state agency had not held defendant utility in violation of statute, and defendant’s 
conduct was not proximate cause of injury); Entex v. Gonzalez, 94 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. App. 
2002) (denying negligence per se claim where governing statute did not prescribe specific 
duty for gas supplier). 
216 See Bede v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 2002 WL 1000400 *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting Eisenhuth v. Moneyhun, 119 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio 1954)); Mosteller, 698 S.E.2d at 442. 
217 See Mont. Power, 943 P.2d at 1252–53. Under current federal standards, utilities are not 
required to take affirmative action to remove encroaching vegetation unless a power outage 
occurs. See N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Facilities Design, Connections, and 
Maintenance Standards 003–1 (2006), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/fac-003-
1.pdf and http://perma.cc/0VB34HdVo34. 
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 Instead, the threshold for forest fire liability should be negli-
gence—if a company breaches a duty of care, then it is appropriate to 
assign costs related to that breach rather than allocate costs to the pub-
lic. Courts have typically adopted a negligence standard where statutory 
language is ambiguous.218 This is consistent with the standard of liabil-
ity in most jurisdictions,219 and avoids imposing costs for disasters that 
can occur even if reasonable precautions are taken.220 The duty of care 
imposed on public utilities is high, reducing the necessity for relaxed 
standards of liability.221 This high duty of care puts pressure on tortious 
utilities to settle cases when they are even slightly at fault, which avoids 
costly litigation.222 
B. Injury to National Forests: Accounting for Both Economic and 
Environmental Damages 
 Forest fires in National Forests cause both economic and ecologi-
cal harm: the former from the loss of forest assets (mainly timber), and 
the latter from the loss of forest services (habitat, recreation, scenery, 
etc.).223 Courts recognize that damage awards must encompass both 
types of harms.224 Market valuation is a useful tool for evaluating eco-
nomic loss, but it captures neither the value of non-commercial assets, 
nor the value of environmental services.225 
                                                                                                                      
218 See Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 321 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Wis. 
1982); see also Rocky Mountain Power, 2011 WL 3423383 at *4–5. 
219 See, e.g., United States v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1142, 1144 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008)(United States able to bring state law claims against San Francisco for fire arising 
out of negligent maintenance of a utility pole); Giorgi v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 
119, 120, 123 (Ct. App. 1968) (State of California and individual firemen bring suit against 
utility company for forest fire arising from negligence); see also S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United 
States, 415 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that the United States Forest Service 
commonly includes liability provisions in right-of-way agreements with public utilities, 
which impose liability for negligent operation of power lines). 
220 See Schulz, supra note 7, at 21. 
221 See Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Rys., 69 A.2d 90, 92 (Penn. 1949) (noting that the duty of 
a power line owner involves the very highest degree of care in avoiding injury to others); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1965) (stating that negligence includes failure to 
act in accordance with duty to others). 
222 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 39 (“These cases [involving clear fault] can (and per-
haps should) be settled without significant litigation.”). 
223 See supra notes 93–197. 
224 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 
2008) (allowing United States to seek damages for loss of timber, habitat, and environmen-
tal services after forest fire). 
225 See Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Mar-
ket valuation can of course serve as one factor to be considered, but by itself it will neces-
sarily be incomplete.”). 
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 Where market valuation is inapplicable, restoration damages 
should be used.226 Restoration damages have a broad foundation in 
common law when applied to non-marketable assets.227 The idea of us-
ing restoration to account for intangible environmental value has 
strong scholarly support.228 Finally, restoring a forest to its pre-injured 
condition—or a close approximation thereof—will renew forest ser-
vices and benefit the environment.229 
1. Economic Damages 
 Because a National Forest has no real estate market value, it is sen-
sible to use the market value of any commercial timber as a substitute 
for calculating economic damages.230 The Eastern District of Califor-
nia’s approach in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. is exemplary: 
The cost of lost timber was itemized as its own category of damages, 
separate from other environmental harms.231 This approach makes 
sense, given that timber represents the most easily quantifiable “use 
value” of forests.232 The court’s award of damages for lost timber in 
Wilderness areas is also logical.233 In a sense, defendants had forced the 
court’s hand; quantifying the value of non-commercial trees as zero, as 
defendants had requested, would ignore their use in recreation, tour-
                                                                                                                      
226 See Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 333. 
227 See, e.g., Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (allowing United States to seek restora-
tion costs for non-merchantable trees); S. Ry. Co. v. Crowe, 366 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1988) (awarding restoration costs for seedlings after a forest fire); Keitges v. Van-
Dermeulen, 483 N.W.2d 137, 140–43 (Neb. 1992) (awarding restoration costs when own-
er’s personal use of trees is not measurable by commercial standards, and listing cases 
from several jurisdictions making similar awards). 
228 See Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 333 (“Properly performed, restoration is a 
limited, thoughtful response to the destruction of natural resources.”); see also Thompson, 
supra note 145, at 88 (arguing that restoration costs for lost natural resource services 
would be an effective way to calculate natural resource damages). 
229 See Blumm & Wigington, supra note 192, at 67–69; Loomis & Richardson, supra 
note 21, at 31–33; see also Kimball, supra note 7, at 45 (suggesting that restoration costs best 
capture the United States’ role as steward of National Forests). 
230 See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1143, 1147 (allowing United States to seek dam-
ages for burnt timber in the absence of market valuation for the land.) 
231 Id. at 1139. 
232 See Cross, Damage Valuation, supra note 145, at 281 (“use value” includes consump-
tive uses). 
233 See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1146–47. 
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ism, and wildlife protection,234 as well as providing a perverse incentive 
to future litigants.235 
 The Eastern District of California was also on point in awarding 
restoration costs for young, non-marketable trees destroyed by the Stor-
rie fire.236 The broad language of California’s Health and Safety Code, 
providing liability for any damages caused by a fire, supported the res-
toration award.237 But non-statutory law also supports restoration dam-
ages for young trees and should be applied in nearly all cases involving 
damage to National Forests.238 
 Many jurisdictions support the proposition that restoration costs 
can capture the aesthetic or personal value of trees.239 The federal gov-
ernment has an analogous interest in preserving young trees in Na-
tional Forests, which it holds in trust for future generations.240 In other 
contexts, the United States has been allowed to recover restoration 
costs for damage to resources held in the public trust.241 After forest 
fires, the United States should be allowed to assert its institutional in-
terest as a trustee under the common law.242 
 Courts, however, should not award full restoration costs indiscrimi-
nately.243 If compensation is granted for timber loss, restoration costs 
should not be awarded for marketable timber.244 This would represent 
impermissible double recovery, as replanting is a natural consequence 
of any sale.245 In many situations, moreover, it may be reasonable to re-
                                                                                                                      
234 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §2104 (2012)). 
235 Id. at 1147 (“[U]nder [defendant’s] view, [defendant] essentially had a free pass to 
burn this land.”). 
236 Id. at 1150–51. 
237 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13007 (2012). 
238 See Crowe, 366 S.E.2d at 848 (awarding restoration costs for seedlings after a forest 
fire). 
239 See, e.g., Keitges, 483 N.W.2d at 140–43 (awarding restoration costs when owner’s 
personal use of trees is not measurable by commercial standards); see also Heninger v. 
Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing general proposition that restoration 
costs can be granted for aesthetic or personal value). 
240 See Union Pac., 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
241 See Yang et al., supra note 149, at 75–76 (CERCLA statute authorizes government 
to recover restoration costs for certain use damages). 
242 Cf. Union Pacific, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (finding significance in the fact that Na-
tional Forest was held in trust by United States). 
243 See, e.g., Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (holding cost of restoring trees and under-
growth to be unreasonably excessive despite substantial evidence of plaintiff’s aesthetic 
interest). 
244 See Crowe, 366 S.E.2d at 848 (noting that restoration costs after forest fire were 
properly limited to seedlings). 
245 See Kimball, supra note 7, at 41. 
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store forest land partially rather than restoring it to a wilderness state.246 
This would comport with the general common law requirement of rea-
sonableness for restoration costs,247 and would avoid tying damages ju-
risprudence to an unrealistic ideal of an unchanging natural world.248 
2. Intangible Environmental Damages 
 Union Pacific addressed intangible environmental damages—to 
soil, scenery, and recreation—by allowing the United States to present a 
valuation based on Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA).249 This was an 
imperfect solution.250 HEA is ill-suited for evaluating forest fire damag-
es and has reached wildly divergent results in practice.251 It is not clear 
whether HEA will survive admissibility tests in future cases.252 
 The problems with HEA are a microcosm of the difficulties inher-
ent in quantifying environmental damages.253 The ecological benefits 
of forests certainly have value—as outside studies have shown254—but it 
is difficult to put a precise monetary figure on the value of a single for-
est.255 Even if ecological benefits could be perfectly quantified, the re-
sulting figure would value the forest only with respect to human use, 
ignoring its intrinsic value.256 
 The United States abandoned the quest for precise quantification 
after the Copper Fire of 2002, and instead left it to a jury to determine 
                                                                                                                      
246 See Cross, Restoration, supra note 177, at 333–34. 
247 See, e.g., Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 108–09; Evenson v. Lilley, 228 P.3d 420, 422–24 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (holding restoration costs unreasonable where they exceeded twice 
the highest estimate of the property prior to injury). 
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the value of environmental harms suffered after a forest fire.257 The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the jury’s award of environmental damages and 
found that the award was rational and not grossly excessive.258 Utility 
companies have questioned the basis of this award and argue that the 
jury imposed punishment rather than compensation.259 If true, this 
would undermine the rationality of the decision—as one commentator 
has noted, lawsuits are ineffective deterrents against forest fires.260 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision was a step forward for recovery of en-
vironmental damages after forest fires.261 But in order to reduce subjec-
tivity, a better approach might be to use restoration costs as a basis for 
evaluating environmental harms.262 Restoration damages could poten-
tially be tailored to the severity of the fire—in cases where soil damage 
prevents new growth, high restoration costs would be appropriate, 
while in cases where fire simply clears brush, a lower award could be 
given.263 Partial restoration costs could be given at a judge’s discretion, 
lending flexibility to environmental valuation.264 Again, the big danger 
for courts applying or allowing restoration damages is potential double 
recovery for costs related to loss of timber.265 For example, restoration 
of scenery would be necessary after a timber sale, regardless of a fire 
starter’s tortious conduct.266 A careful court, however, should be able to 
work around this problem.267 
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Conclusion 
 Forest fire litigation has grown increasingly contentious in recent 
years. Public utilities, which serve valuable public ends but present una-
voidable fire risks, are in the crosshairs. Because forest fire litigation is 
generally governed by state law, there is no consistent doctrine in place 
to govern this growing problem. 
 Courts have understandably shied away from imposing liability for 
forest fires absent a showing of fault. Some courts, moreover, have gone 
further by forbidding the federal government from recovering the costs 
of fighting fires on its own land regardless of how the fires start. This 
course of action could potentially pass the costs of negligent corporate 
behavior onto taxpayers. A better path is to read a liability requirement 
into broad, ambiguously worded statutes, without dismissing the United 
States as a party. 
 Forest fires can have numerous long-term effects on National For-
ests, and any calculation of damages that ignores these effects is in-
complete. Damages jurisprudence should take into account the intrin-
sic value of National Forests, which are held in trust for present and 
future generations. Economic value, while useful and relatively easy to 
calculate, does not adequately capture a forest’s worth. One possible 
solution is to allow recovery of restoration damages for injury to Na-
tional Forests. This approach has a solid foundation in case law and 
would best ensure a renewal of the incalculable environmental benefits 
that forests provide. 
